“The Reason Why” by Cecil Woodham-Smith

            Cecil Woodham-Smith’s approach to the history of the Charge of the Light Brigade is to reveal the many causes that led to the tragedy of the Charge.  These causes range from social forces, such as the institution of the British military, to the many individuals who had either a direct or indirect impact on the events.  From the standpoint of the individual her primary focus is on the two officers who commanded those soldiers involved in the charge.  However she does present the personalities of many individuals who she believes helped to create both long term and short term causes for the Charge.  Considering her background as being in “the front rank of biographers specializing in the nineteenth century,” she is well suited for this approach.  Her first book, a biography of Florence Nightengale, led her naturally to this book.  Much of her background study for her book on Florence Nightengale involved much research into the Crimean War.

            “The Reason Why” is not a total history of the Crimean War, rather a very exhaustive background of events that led to one battle in that war; and in particular one part of that battle known as The Charge of the Light Brigade.  In his background Woodham-Smith reveals much about the institution of the British military, as well as social forces of the day that influenced the military, and finally of individuals whose character and personality had both long range and short range effects on the Charge.  She reveals some of the paradigms of that era, and goes on to show how these mindsets were instrumental to the outcome of the Charge.  It was a tragic combination of aristocratic arrogance, outdated military traditions, and inexperienced but vain officers that Woodham-Smith believes, and very acutely shows, combined to ensure both the tragedy and stupidity leading to and involving that day.

            Woodham-Smith combines a plethora of short term and long term causes for this disaster.   She begins her book by informing the reader of what turns out to be a long term cause.  The book, at first, seems to be a biography of both the Earl of Cardigan and the Earl of Lucan.  In her introduction to these two men she is able to bring out their characteristics and background.  All, in her mind, which led to Balaclava.  One of the reasons for the disaster had to do with the hatred Lords Lucan and Cardigan shared for each other.  Woodham-Smith practically begins her history with this point.  “The two young men disliked each other from the first.” (Woodham-Smith, p. 16)  And, in this first paragraph of chapter two she also reveals the aspects of their character, that will in the long run, have an effect on the charge.  “Both were soldiers, fiercely ambitious in their profession; both were proud, narrow, overbearing, and peremptory.” (Woodham-Smith, p. 16)   Throughout the book these elements in the lives of the two principle actors in the Charge pops up time and time again, revealing to the reader that these were not merely character flaws that mellowed or leveled off with age.  Rather, for one thing,  it was a real hatred the two had for each other that they carried with them into the battle at Balaclava and beyond.  For another, it was unbelievable pride and arrogance they both possessed that blinded them to almost everything around them, including the stupidity of their stubbornness and arrogance at Balaclava.  It was their overbearing and peremptory personalities that ruined their soldiers and horses even before the battle began.

            In “A Preface to History” Carl G. Gustavson points out that, “One cause may stimulate other causes…. In a large-scale episode, …one cause may unleash other causes, a development which is originally an effect in turn causing further effects in a sequence of reactions” (p. 63)     The purchase system of the British military was one such cause in that institution.  It reinforced the arrogance of the aristocracy.  It allowed incompetent, vain, and sometimes utterly stupid men to gain command of military forces.

             Woodham-Smith points out the fact that such an incompetent person as Lord Brudenell was able to take command of the 15^th King’s Hussars only because of the purchase system that had become such an integral part of the British military. The purchase system is looked upon today as an unbelievably inept way of awarding rank and command to men of the British military.  Even at the time other nations seemed to see the foolishness of the system.  But it was considered both proper and wise by British society of that day.  It was felt that only the aristocracy was capable of military command.  “War was an aristocratic trade, and military glory reserved for nobles and princes…. Courage was esteemed the essential military quality and held to be a virtue exclusive to aristocrats.” (Woodham-Smith, p. 1)  It was not competency that was even considered; it was courage that was glorified.  The long-range effect was the tragedy of Balaclava.  Causal factors built upon causal factors probably had its beginnings even before the purchase system, but Woodham-Smith begins here, and carefully builds each cause upon the other until we come to that tragic battle.

            One aspect of British society this purchase system promoted was the class contempt the aristocracy had for those not of nobility.  Throughout this history Woodham-Smith writes of situations and actions that were the direct result of this class contempt.  Again, this became a cause of the failure at Balaclava that was built upon another cause, and had yet other causes built upon it.

            For Lord Brudenell, the Earl of Cardigan, class contempt was a part of his nature, but, as was so often the case in this history, events seemed to happen at just the right time to accentuate any causal circumstance.  "Such arrogance and such contempt were native to Lord Brudenell, but it happened that in 1832 his feelings had been violently inflamed by contemporary events.  That year of 1832 was the year of the Reform Bill.” (Woodham-Smith, p. 32)  This was a bill meant to give a fairer representation of seats in the British Parliament.  The aristocracy, however, felt it meant they would be losing their powerful grip on the government.  This was especially galling to Lord Brudenell whose, “enormous faith in himself was based on the principle of hereditary aristocracy…. The question was one of divine right; his rank gave him a divine right to command and to be obeyed.” (Woodham-Smith, p. 33)

            This frame of mind for many of the military leaders from the aristocracy led to a more startling occurrence; one with much graver results.  It allowed incompetent men into command positions in the military.  This was never more true than in the case of Lord Brudenell.  “By virtue of that principle he could brush aside the facts that he was perhaps more stupid than other men, that there were ideas he could not grasp, conclusions which eluded him, results he failed to anticipate.” (Woodham-Smith, p. 33)  Much of Woodham-Smith’s book is a recounting of the many times Brudenell’s stupidity and arrogance caused discontent, failure and ultimately the loss of life at Balaclava.

            But he was not alone.  The institution called the British Military was also culpable for many of the errors committed during that battle.  At one time Lord Brudenell was put on half-pay as a result of his arrogance and treatment of his officers under his command.  Under any other circumstances it would be justifiably assumed that he was now forever out of the picture.  Not so under the British military that used the purchase system, and was led by men of the aristocracy who seemed to believe that position in life counted for more than good sense.  Public opinion was eventually scorned and Cardigan was given another command. 

            This, again, is an example of one causal factor built upon another.  If the aristocratic society of that time had not had such arrogance in their feelings of class superiority Cardigan would probably not have been given another command.  And, if he would have never been given another command, he certainly would not have been there to lead the tragic charge of the Light Brigade.  One may wonder if the system would have placed someone else in that position anyway, but Woodham-Smith carefully lays one cause upon another to show that it was all of these factors that came together to cause the fiasco at Balaclava.  Without any one of the major causes the outcome would most likely have been entirely different.  There is a good chance that the British army would not even have been in that place at that time if not for the arrogance of men such as Cardigan.

            Half-pay duty was another tradition of the British military that, especially in this historical account, played an important role in the tragedy a Balaclava.  It is another example of how causal factors built upon each other.  Since the aristocracy could purchase a command, they could also step down whenever they felt a desire to do so.  Often this desire occurred when their regiment was scheduled to spend a tour of duty that was considered unpleasant.  Since the aristocratic officers felt a tour of duty in India to be unpleasant they would invariably turn their command over to other officers during that tour, and go on half-pay.

            Officers not of nobility were already considered lower class.  This practice of avoiding the India tour of duty only served to accentuate those feelings.  Indian officers were looked down on by those officers of aristocracy.  In the Crimean War this may have proved fatal.  There were officers available who had the appropriate military experience to meet the demands of that war.  Their only flaw was that they were “Indian officers.”  It was often for this reason only the experience of these officers was not called upon by most of the aristocratic officers.

            Here is where an exception proves the rule.  One such Indian officer was Colonel Beatson.  He had the military experience and discipline required to command the type of troops required during the Crimean War, but when he made his services available to Lord Raglan, the commander in charge of the army, he was refused.  Raglan’s excuse was that Beatson was in command of irregular troops composed of Turkish Moslems.  “Lord Raglan angrily refused. Firm believer in orthodoxy and discipline as he was, the very suggestion of irregular troops was vile to him, nor did he find Colonel Beatson’s Indian career any recommendation.” (Woodham-Smith, p. 172)

            His services were also refused by Lord Lucan for what appears to be the same reasons.  However, one officer, General Scarlett of the Heavy Brigade  did accept his offer, and took him and another Indian officer on as a part of his staff.  And it was General Scarlett who, during the battle of Balaclava, was to perform “one of the great feats of cavalry against cavalry in the history of Europe.”  (Woodham-Smith, p. 219)  Credit was given to his two Indian advisors for the success of this feat.  Why did Scarlett use these two men when the others turned them down?  Woodham-Smith makes a very biting remark when giving what she feels is the reason.  General Scarlett she writes, “had…two qualities which his colleagues conspicuously lacked: he possessed modesty and good sense.”  (Woodham-Smith, p. 218)

            The class hatred the aristocracy possessed blinded them to the possibilities officers such as Beatson would have given them.  One can only conjecture what would have been the outcome of the battle had these officers been accepted by Lucan or Raglan.  Quite possibly they would have prevailed in what surely would have been their advice not to make the Charge.

            In his book Gustavson dedicates one chapter to the individual in history.  In this chapter he writes, “One can immediately call to mind certain persons who definitely seem to have changed the course of history in their own countries.”  (Gustavson, p. 125)  He points out, however, that this is often debatable, and later on writes, “History is often made by the right man at the right time.” (Gustavson, p. 128)  I do not believe it can be said that one individual was the primary cause of the events leading to the tragedy at Balaclava.  I do not believe that Cecil Woodham-Smith was trying to make such a point in her book.  I do believe, however, that it was the personality and character of a number of individuals that helped bring this battle to its tragic conclusion.

            One man in this history stands out primarily because of the force of his personality.  That man was the Duke of Wellington.  It was his force of character and personality that at times seemed to alone carry enough weight to make a decision stand, or cause a tradition to be carried on which otherwise would likely have been doomed. 

            He was extremely adamant, and possibly with due concern, that the government not get involved in the day-to-day affairs of the military; especially with regard to military discipline.  It was for this reason that he would not allow public opinion, especially through the House of Commons, influence how he carried out disciplinary matters.  This attitude was unfortunately evident when the public clamored for the resignation or dismissal of the Earl of Cardigan.  The Duke of Wellington would not even allow the military to ask for his resignation for fear that the public would see that as the result of their influence, and thereby set a precedent which would cause them to forever get involved in military matters.

            When Secretary of War, Thomas Babington Macaulay, in response to an article in “The Times” London newspaper, said, “It had therefore been reluctantly decided that the Earl must take the earliest possible opportunity to sell out, thus being afforded the grace of having originated his own retirement.” (Woodham-Smith, p. 85)   The Duke of Wellington, “…was not to be moved: he was not going to allow the Army to submit to political control, the Army must manage its own discipline according to its own code.” (Woodham-Smith, p. 85-86)  It was the force of his personality that allowed the Duke to overcome the wishes of the Secretary of War, and the “very great pressure…being put on Lord Hill,” the Commander-in-Chief. (Woodham-Smith, p. 85)

            But the Duke’s singular influence did not stop here.  He was such a great commander of military forces that much of the failures of the military traditions, such as the purchase system, went unnoticed.  So much so that even his successors attempted to conduct military affairs in the same manner as did the Duke of Wellington.  Lord Raglan, who commanded the British Army of the Crimean War, had attained his rank and experience as second to the Duke.  Yet, although he experienced some of the glory days associated with the Duke, he never actually had experience in battle.  “For more than forty years he had been subservient to one of the most powerful minds in the history of the world.  …[But] he had never commanded so much as a battalion in the field; he had never led troops into battle in his life.” (Woodham-Smith, p. 157)

            But, “as old men do, Lord Raglan lived much in the past.”  (Woodham-Smith, p. 157)  He saw everything from the point of view he used to have as second in command to the Duke of Wellington.  With this frame of mind he believed he could conduct military affairs as did the Duke.  He did not, however, have the force of personality of the Duke, and was therefore unable to overcome the many trivialities brought on by vain and arrogant men such as the Earls of Cardigan and Lucan.

            This brings up another aspect of the Duke’s personality that had an ongoing effect on the military, both during his time of command, and long after.  He had such a forcefulness of personality that he was able to command with the iron hand that overcame the incompetence displayed by many of his aristocratic officers.  It was because of his success and brilliance as a military leader that the British remained oblivious to the inadequacies of the purchase system.  Therefore, when someone like Lord Raglan took command, the military was not prepared to meet the ramifications of years of inept and arrogant aristocratic military officers.

            Another force that played an important role in the history of the Charge of the Light Brigade was the institution of the military itself.  Although it was the Duke of Wellington who prevailed by his sheer force of personality to prevent changes in the way military discipline was conducted, it is always difficult to make significant changes in a social institution.  As Gustavson points out, “the law of self-preservation and aggrandizement is deeply rooted in all organizations.”  (Gustavson, p. 91)   This was never more true than in the British military of the mid Nineteenth Century.  Old traditions remained on even after they no longer served a legitimate purpose.  The use of the purchase system was an unbelievable example of this truth.  Their folly was viewing it from the standpoint of past successes.  The English were proud of their successes, and they had many.  And most all of them came from a military whose officers received their commands through the purchase system.  They were blind to the inadequacies; blind to the arrogance of officers and the resultant loss of military preparedness.  They closed their ears to a public who began to see the folly long before they were willing to admit the same.  They failed to realize they could not go unchecked.  Instead they assumed it was their right and their prerogative to indefinitely strengthen itself by keeping itself free from outside influence.

            Such a paradigm resulted in the disaster known as The Charge of the Light Brigade.  It may have gone down in history as a romantic view of the valor of the British soldier, but in the long run all the causes that led to that tragedy also led to military reform.  After the Crimean War reform came to the military of England, as well as in Europe and the United States.  “[T]he conditions under which commissions and promotion were obtained were reformed.” (Woodham-Smith, p. 271)  Reform was not easy; the military institution was reluctant to change.  But change did occur; the result of causal factors that began centuries earlier. 

“Each historical event is conditioned…by a background composed of various social forces.”  (Gustavson, p. 71)  Cecil Woodham-Smith excellently conveyed this truth in “The Reason Why.”  The reader finishes this book convinced that no one singular event, person, social force or institution in and of itself caused the tragedy of the battle at Balaclava.  She was able to smoothly take the reader from one event to the next; from one person to the next, and show how that event or person created the factors that enables the next factor to occur.  If it was not a person or event it was an institution or social force that allowed the person or event to become the next causal factor.

If there is one opinion of the author that comes out in the book it is that the purchase system was an incredible folly which allowed incredibly stupid men like Cardigan to obtain a military command.  But her book is so full of facts, based on extensive research, that one comes away realizing that her opinion is well grounded.  Time after time she is able to give the history behind the events that led to the Charge, and each time that history reveals the stupidity and arrogance of an aristocracy unable to see beyond themselves.  As a reader I was astounded by the number of occurrences that were precipitated by incompetent men.  And, these were men who held at least part of the reigns of power in the British government and military.

It is true that it is hard for us to look back and understand how a society could accept such arrogance and incompetence.  Woodham-Smith does allude to the fact that the system in use in their military had been successful, therefore implying there was no reason for that society to see a need to change.  And, she also points out that the press was able to put enough pressure on the military to cause them to at least consider change.  There was, therefore, an acknowledgement that this was not going to be forever accepted by British society.

I did not get the impression that she was biased in her approach to this history.  She simply allowed the facts to speak for themselves.  And, they were able to speak loudly to the folly of all that led to Balaclava.  Her narrative was indeed smooth.  Reading this book was much like reading a good mystery novel.  I was always anxious to read further, wondering what more could possibly be added to show the multitude of causes that led to the Charge.  Yet if it were a novel it probably would not have been believed.  Only the truth could be so bizarre, and Woodham-Smith conveyed the truth very well.

Works Cited

 Gustavson, Carl G. A Preface To History. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955.

Woodham-Smith, Cecil. The Reason Why. 1953. New York: McGraw-Hill; New York: E. P. Dutton, 1960.